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COMMENT

CAST BACK INTO "TEMPEST-TOST"
WATERS: THE "UNCHARTED SEAS" OF
PRIVATE MEDICAL REPATRIATIONS

While driving on a Florida road during the course of his job as a
gardener in the winter of 2000, Luis Jim6nez was struck head-on by a
drunk driver who had stolen a van.' Two of Jiminez's fellow
passengers were killed instantly. The driver and Jim6nez, both
severely injured, were taken to the emergency department at Martin
Memorial Medical Center, a not-for-profit community hospital.
Jim6nez was unconscious and in shock from extensive bleeding. He
had two broken thigh bones, a broken arm, multiple internal injuries,
facial lacerations, and a severe head injury.2 Perhaps most
significantly to his treatment plan, he also arrived at the hospital as an
undocumented and uninsured immigrant.
Jim6nez survived the accident, but he did so with serious
permanent brain injuries. Though he lingered in an unconscious,
unresponsive state for over a year, he eventually-and quite
suddenly-awoke and began interacting with those around him. 4 In

I Deborah Sontag, Deported, by U.S. Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at Al
[hereinafter Sontag (August)]. This was one theft in the course of the driver's long criminal
record of robberies and drug abuse. Following this accident, the driver was convicted of two
counts of DUI manslaughter and served a seven-year prison term. Within four months of his
release, he borrowed a neighbor's car and was involved in another hit-and-run accident, for
which he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. See Melissa E. Holsman, DriverWho Hit
Lais Jiminez Sentenced to 25 Years for Repeat Offense, STUART NEWS, Aug. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2009/aug/17/man-who-hit-luis-jimenez-sentenced-to
-25-years/.
2 Sontag (August), supranote 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
281

282

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

time, he was able to regain mental capabilities comparable to those of
an eight- or nine-year-old child.'
His basic recovery took quite some time-and an enormous
amount of money. The cost of Jiminez's care amounted to over $1
million.6 Jim6nez was uninsured and unable to pay for his care. The
federal government covered only $80,000 of the total bill.
Facing an indefinite stay, mounting costs of care, and no
government or private funding to support Jim6nez's rehabilitative,
non-emergency treatment, Martin Memorial began to consider its
options. When the hospital suggested that Jim6nez be transported to
Guatemala, his country of origin, the family and his legal guardian
objected.8 Litigation on the matter ensued, but before the case was
fully resolved, the hospital secretly chartered a plane and transported
Jim6nez to Guatemala without the knowledge of his family or legal
guardian.9 Though a court eventually ruled that the hospital's actions
were illegal,10 it was too late-Jim6nez had been medically
repatriated.
Jim6nez's situation is not unusual-indeed, his roommate for part
of his time at Martin Memorial was repatriated to Jamaica." Many
immigrants are uninsured. Though hospitals are required to provide
emergency treatment to everyone regardless of ability to pay,12 the
government only reimburses the hospitals for a portion of the
uncompensated care and ceases all compensation as soon as the
patient is medically "stable." 3 Hospitals are required by federal law
to arrange for long-term care for those who need it, 14 but Medicaid
does not cover long-term care for undocumented immigrants or those
who are newly arrived in the U.S.' 5 In addition, most long-term care

5 Id.
6 Montejo v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr. (Montejo 1), 874 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). The average costs for a patient at Martin Memorial are $8,188, and the average stay
is 4.1 days. Sontag (August), supra note 1.
7 Sontag (August), supra note 1.

8 Id.

9 Id.
10 See Montejo 1, 874 So. 2d at 658.
1 Sontag (August), supra note 1.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) (requiring hospital emergency departments to provide
emergency care).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2006) (providing for federal payment to states for treating
aliens not lawfully admitted for permanent residence during a medical emergency).
14 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 (2008) (prescribing standards for patient discharge plans).
1s See Rachel Benson Gold, Immigrants and Medicaid after Welfare Reform,
GIuTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, May 2003, at 6, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/tgr/06/2/gr060206.html.
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facilities will not accept patients who are uninsured or even those who
have Medicaid.16
"Medical repatriation" refers to a practice in which private
hospitals attempt to return immigrants-both documented and
undocumented and, in at least one case, a U.S. citizen7-to their
countries of origin because the hospital determines that it can no
longer afford the costs of caring for them. Federal immigration and
customs enforcement are not involved in these cases. While most
hospitals say that they only conduct cross-border transfers once
patients are medically stable, and that they arrange to deliver them
into a physician's care in their homeland, "[these] hospitals are
operating in a void, without governmental assistance or oversight,
leaving ample room for legal and ethical transgressions on both sides
of the border."18 Stephen Larson, a migrant health expert and
physician at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, told the
New York Times that "[t]he opportunity to turn your back is there
[for hospitals] .

. .

. You're given an out by there not being formal

regulations. The question is whether or not litigation, or prosecution,
catches up and hospitals start to be held liable." 9
This Comment explores the legal and regulatory context in which
medical repatriations take place. Part I of this Comment will provide
a background picture of medical repatriations in the United States.
Part II will examine hospitals' legal obligations with a particular
emphasis on civil liability under state law and federal statutory law,
and will address the inconsistent incentives these laws and regulations
promote. Finally, Part III will provide brief suggestions for next steps
for resolving some of the tensions in existing law, as well as guiding
principles for possible reforms.

Sontag (August), supra note 1.
See Deborah Sontag, Deported in Coma, Saved Back in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at Al [hereinafter Sontag (November)]. Elliott Bustamante was born in a Tucson, Arizona
hospital with Down syndrome and a heart condition. Just two days later, the same hospital
attempted to transfer him to Mexico for care even though he was a United States citizen. Id.
Elliott's mother explained to the New York Times: "We were so scared. They said we had no
rights, the baby neither. They said they would send the baby with or without me. When Elliott
was two weeks, they told me to gather my things because the baby was leaving in 15 minutes
with a lady. It was very ugly. We contacted the Mexican consulate. They got us a lawyer." Id.
Despite communications with the hospital, the lawyer actually had to ask police to intercept the
baby on the way to the airport with hospital officials. Id. Several days later, the hospital told the
parents that "[l]egally ... the baby could be considered to be trespassing" due to unpaid medical
bills. Id. After much back and forth, Elliott eventually qualified for Medicaid, and he was not
transported to Mexico. Id.
18 Sontag (August), supra note 1.
19 Sontag (November), supra note 17.
6

17
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I. MEDICAL REPATRIATIONS IN AMERICA

In 1970, there were approximately 9.6 million immigrants in the
United States. 20 In 2005, the United States Census Bureau reported
that there were 35.2 million,2 1 over three and a half times the number
in 1970. In 1970, 4.7% of the United States population was made up
of immigrants; in 2005, that percentage rose to 12.1%.22 Of the 35.2
million immigrants residing in the United States in 2005,
approximately 9.6 to 9.8 million were estimated to be
undocumented.23 More than half of all immigrants in the United
States are from Latin America, and just over a third are from Central
America, including Mexico. 4 California, Texas, Arizona, Illinois,
New York City, and Florida have the highest numbers of
immigrants.
Nearly one quarter of those living in poverty in the United States
are immigrants and their children.2 6 One third of immigrants do not
have health insurance (compared to only 13% of native-born
Americans),27 and approximately 65% of undocumented immigrants
lack health insurance.2 8 One study found that annual per capita
expenses for health care were 86% lower for uninsured immigrant
children than for uninsured U.S.-born children-but emergency
department expenditures were more than three times as high.29
Whether or not they have health insurance, immigrants overall have
much lower per capita health care expenditures than native-born
Americans,30 and recent analyses indicate that they contribute more to
the economy in taxes than they receive in public benefits.3 1 In a study
from the RAND Corporation, researchers estimated that
undocumented adult immigrants account for only about 1.5% of U.S.
20 See Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's
Foreign-BornPopulationin 2005, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Washington,
D.C.), Dec. 2005, at 5 fig.2, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/backl4O5.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Id.
2 Id. at 23.
24 See NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION:

2000, at 2 (2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf.
25See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTRORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2005, at 7 tbl.4 (2006), available at http://www.dhs
.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILLPE_2005.pdf.
2 See Camarota,supra note 20, at 14-15.
2 Id. at 15.
2 Id. at 26.
2 See Sarita A. Mohanty et al., Health Care Expenditures of Immigrants in the United
States: A NationallyRepresentativeAnalysis, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1431, 1435 (2005).
3 See id.
31 Id.
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medical costs. 3 2 Many immigrants do not seek medical treatment
unless they are injured or acutely ill. It is amidst this context that the
issue of medical repatriations arises.
As noted above, "medical repatriations" are private transfers of
patients from hospitals in the United States to health care facilities in
other countries. These transfers do not occur with the involvement or
oversight of the federal government, which has exclusive jurisdiction
over immigration and deportation matters.33 While most repatriations
involve undocumented immigrants like Luis Jim6nez, some involve
immigrants who are legally present in the United States. For example,
a nineteen-year-old farm worker named Antonio Torres was
repatriated from a hospital in Phoenix to Mexico, despite his status as
a lawful permanent resident.M He was uninsured, and the Phoenix
hospital was unwilling to cover the costs of his post-accident care,
even though the hospital had determined that "there was no hope" for
Torres.35 Against the wishes of his parents, Torres, then comatose and
connected to a ventilator with pneumonia and a very high white blood
cell count, was transported to Mexico. After four days of receiving no
attention in a Mexican emergency room, his parents were able to find
a hospital in California that agreed to treat him. 36 They borrowed an
ambulance and drove Torres back to the United States, where he
arrived in septic shock with a raging infection.37 Despite these
setbacks, the hospital was able to save his life and he made a good
recovery.38 Others have been less fortunate.
It is difficult to estimate the frequency with which these
repatriations occur. However, it is apparent that they happen
frequently enough to create a market for at least one company that
specializes in repatriation services. MexCare, which advertises itself
as "an alternative choice for care of the unfunded Latin American

32 Dana P. Goldman et al., Immigrants and the Cost of Medical Care, 25 HEALTH AFF.
1700, 1709 (2006).
33Montejo 1, 874 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Johns v. Dep't of
Justice, 653 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1981); Torros v. State, 415 So. 2d 908 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App.
1982)).
3 See Sontag (November), supra note 17.
35Id. Torres' father reported that the social worker told him that "there was no hope for
our son and that it would be best to unplug him [from the ventilator].... And if he wakes up, he
will not be able to do much." Id. He said that when he and his wife refused to unplug the
ventilator, the social worker told him that the hospital could not keep their son without
insurance. Id.
36Id. An executive at the California hospital that agreed to treat Torres told the New York
Times: "We don't export patients . . .. I can understand the frustrations of other hospitals, but
the flip side is the human being element." Id.
37 Id.

38 Id.
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national," was founded in 2001 .39 The company contracts with
hospitals to transfer stabilized individuals from the hospital to health
care facilities outside of the United States, thus serving as a way to
reduce costs for the hospital.4
The Los Angeles Times told the story of one nineteen-year-old
patient for whom a hospital had utilized MexCare's (then "Nextcare")
services. 4 1 After a car accident, the patient arrived at the hospital's
emergency room with a shattered leg and broken jaw. He was
transferred to a hospital in Mexico. According to MexCare and the
hospital, his transfer was voluntary, and the decision was
unpressured.42 According to the patient, he agreed to the transfer
because he was hungry and was told that the hospital in Tijuana could
take the wires out of his jaw.43 Because of "poor communication and
follow-up," however, the patient's gums were infected and grew over
the wires in his mouth, ultimately causing him severe pain-and
immense hunger.4
Responding to criticism from the New York Times, MexCare's
Web site emphasizes that it only transfers patients who have provided
written consent, and claims that the transfers are beneficial both to the
hospitals as well as the patients it serves.45 When compared to
repatriations that occur without a company such as MexCare, this
may be true. Most hospitals conduct repatriations without oversight
and without the guidance of established policies and procedures.4 6
Setting aside the troubling issues that arise from implementing
non-governmental deportations, MexCare at least attempts to provide
a comparable level of health care for its clients. Though not always
successful-as the story mentioned above demonstrates-MexCare
claims that it abides by an individualized discharge plan, enrolls the
39 MexCare, http://mexcare.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
4 MexCare Services, http://mexcare.com/servicesMexCare.html (follow "How we do it"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
41 Lisa Richardson, Patients Without Borders: Amid Rising Health Costs, Illegal
Immigrants in San Diego-Area HospitalsAre Being Transferred Back to Mexico for Treatment,
L.A. TI4ES, Nov. 5, 2003, at Al; see also Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Health Care
Narrative and What It Tells Us About the U.S. Health Care System, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 229,
229 (2008).
42 Richardson, supra note 41. The article reported that the executive vice president of the
Hospital Association of Southern California said that "[s]ending such patients back to Mexico
'is a responsible and inventive way of dealing with a shortage of beds for indigent patients' . . . .
'When you talk about our border states and counties like San Diego, they're tired of waiting for
the federal government to deal with this problem."' Id.
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Press Release, MexCare, The New York Times Gets It Wrong! (Aug. 15, 2008),
available at http://mexcare.com/pressReleaseMexCare.html.
4 Sontag (November), supra note 17.
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patient in one of its partnering clinics, and makes an effort to follow
up on the patient's progress, 47 which is more than can be said of other
hospitals that do not affiliate themselves with a company like
MexCare. As the New York Times noted, though some hospitals
repatriate patients by force, "others do so only with consentalthough consent is a murky concept when patients are told they have
no alternative. While some hospitals pay for an immigrant's
repatriation and for their care in their homelands; others never make
any inquiries into how deported patients have fared.' 4 8 Though
potentially less harmful than repatriations by hospitals, the existence
of and demand for a company like MexCare is one symptom of a
deeply disturbing system that is based purely upon financial
incentives and provides for no oversight and little accountability.
II. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Though there is currently little accountability in the practice of
medical repatriations, there are some possible avenues for legal
challenges. An understanding of the laws-and lack thereof-that
permit and perpetuate this practice is vital in understanding why
repatriations occur and what can be done about them.
A. State Law
1. State-Specific MedicaidProvisions
Medicaid is administered on the state level, with some states
providing more protection for immigrants than others. For example,
while almost all states do not provide funds for non-emergency care
of undocumented immigrants, California has budgeted for long-term
care as part of its state Medicaid program, and this care is available to
undocumented immigrants. 49 A state-by-state examination of
Medicaid is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, as far as the
Author is aware, no state has specifically addressed the issue of
medical repatriations in its Medicaid programming.
2. Civil Liability
Luis Jim6nez's situation is the only one to have been fully litigated
on the precise issue of medical repatriations. Two separate actions
MexCare Press Release, supra note 45.
Sontag (November), supranote 17.
49 Sontag (August), supra note 1. New York City also provides for long-term care for
undocumented immigrants through the Health and Hospitals Corporation of New York City. Id.
47
4
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were filed, and the results have yielded mixed signals about the likely
success of future civil cases.
In the first case, Montejo Gaspar, Jiminez's cousin, initiated
guardianship proceedings for Jim6nez.50 Martin Memorial Medical
Center intervened as an "interested party" to seek approval to
discharge Jiminez from the hospital and transport him to Guatemala,
his country of origin.5 Judge John Fennelly granted the hospital's
request.52 Gaspar's attorneys immediately filed a notice of appeal and
asked for a stay of the court's order while the appeal was pending.ss
Judge Fennelly asked Martin Memorial to file a response by ten
o'clock the following morning so that he could rule upon the request
for a stay.54 Just hours before the response was due, however, the
hospital chartered a private plane for $30,000 and transported
Jim6nez to Guatemala. 5 When Gaspar arrived at the hospital that
morning to visit his cousin, he was gone. 56 The family received no
notice of the hospital's intention to deport Jim6nez.
Gaspar moved forward with the appeal.57 Judge Klein, writing for
a unanimous three-judge panel, determined that while the hospital
was an "interested party" and, therefore, could intervene in the
guardianship proceedings, the evidence did not support the trial
court's order permitting Martin Memorial to discharge Jimdnez and
transport him to Guatemala. Specifically, the court held that the
evidence was not sufficient to show that the hospital complied with its
own policies or the discharge requirements for Medicare providers
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1395X(ee) and 42 C.F.R. § 482.43.59 The court
explained:

50

Montejo 1, 874 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).

5' Id.
52 Id. The New York Times reported that in explaining his decision, Judge Fennelly noted
that: "This Court ... sails on uncharted seas." Sontag (August), supra note 1.
5 Sontag (August), supra note 1.
54 Id.
5 Id.
5 Id.
5 On appeal, the hospital argued that the matter was moot because Jim6nez was in
Guatemala and the issue of whether or not he could return would be preempted by federal
immigration law. Montejo 1, 874 So. 2d at 656. The court, however, explained that this
reasoning merely undermined the hospital's position that the trial court ever had subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a valid authorization for the hospital to deport Jimdnez, as federal
immigration law preempts private repatriations. Id. The court also pointed out that the hospital
was able to make a mootness argument only because of its own actions in transporting Jimdnez
to Guatemala before Judge Fennelly was able to rule on the motion to stay. Id. at 656-57. Judge
Klein noted that, even if the case had been moot, the court would have heard the case because it
presented an important issue which was likely to recur. Id. at 657.
58

Id. at 656, 658.

9 Id. at 657.
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C.F.R. section 482.43(d), the patient can be
by a hospital only to an "appropriate facility"
patient would receive post-hospital care. Such a
defined as one which can meet the patient's

medical needs. . . . Similarly, the hospital's own discharge

policies and procedures require that the discharge plan
identify the next appropriate level of care required by the
patient, identify by name and address the receiving facility,
provide the name of the supervising medical doctor who will
take responsibility for the patient's care at the receiving
facility, and confirm that the doctor will provide the patient
with the identified appropriate level of care.60
In Jim6nez's case, the hospital had determined that the next level
of necessary care would be traumatic brain injury rehabilitation.6 1
While several facilities in Florida could have provided this type of
care, Jim6nez did not have sufficient funds for ongoing treatment and
was ineligible for Medicaid due to his immigration status.62
The appellate court also found that the trial court did not have
sufficient evidence to determine that Jim6nez's transfer to Guatemala
would be to an "appropriate facility" that could meet his medical
needs-namely, traumatic brain injury rehabilitation services. 63 The
trial court, over the objections of Mr. Gaspar's attorney, had admitted
a letter from the Vice Minister of Public Health in Guatemala stating
that a facility in Guatemala was prepared to provide the "necessary
care" for Jiminez without cost.6" The appellate court determined that
this letter was hearsay and, as such, was improperly admitted into
evidence.65 The court also noted that even if it had not been hearsay,
the letter was "not nearly specific enough to satisfy either the federal
regulations or the hospital's discharge procedures."6 The court stated
that the only admissible evidence was the testimony of an expert on
the Guatemalan public health care system, who testified that there
were no public healthcare facilities equipped to provide traumatic
brain injury rehabilitation in Guatemala. 67
60
61
62
63

64
65

Id.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 658.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 658.

66 Id.
67 Id. Jiminez was put in the care of a small Guatemalan clinic that had no traumatic brain
injury rehabilitation services. Sontag (August), supra note 1. Jiminez's wife was contacted by
the clinic to request that she and their sons pick Jimdnez up. Jim6nez did not recognize his wife
when she arrived. Id. He was transferred to another facility, where he was found by his brother
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Summarizing its holding, the appellate court stated: "We therefore
reverse because (1) there was no competent substantial evidence to
support Jim[6]nez's discharge from the hospital, and (2) the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to authorize the transportation
(deportation) of Jim[6]nez to Guatemala." 68 In a somewhat ironic
conclusion, then, it turned out that both of Jimdnez's crossings over
the border were illegal.
In the second case, Gaspar filed suit against Martin Memorial,
seeking monetary damages for falsely imprisoning Jim6nez.69 Under
Florida law, there are four elements of a false imprisonment claim:
"1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person
2) against that person's will 3) without legal authority or 'color of
authority' and 4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the
circumstances." 70 The hospital initially argued that the trial court's
order authorizing it to deport Jim6nez, though eventually declared to
be void, entitled it to immunity from the false imprisonment claim.7 1
The court disagreed, explaining that, although Martin Memorial acted
in reliance upon a court order, that court order was void for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and "Martin Memorial was not cloaked
with absolute immunity from civil liability when acting pursuant to a
void court order .... "7 2 The court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the false imprisonment issue.
On remand, the matter went to a jury trial. The judge instructed the
jury that, because of the first appellate court decision, the case met
three of the four elements of false imprisonment as a matter of law,
and the only issue for their deliberation was whether or not the
hospital acted "unreasonably."73 The all-white, non-Hispanic jury
found that the hospital did not act in a way that was "unreasonable
and unwarranted under the circumstances" when it transferred
Jiminez to Guatemala against the wishes of his guardian.74
"lying in the hallway on a stretcher, covered in his own excrement." Id. at 20. As of the last date
the New York Times spoke with a family member, Jimdnez, who was living with his mother, was
receiving no medical treatment at all, and he had suffered numerous violent seizures. Id.
Without consistent medical care, Jiminez is unlikely to make a recovery.
( Montejo 1, 874 So. 2d at 658. The second reason-that the trial court lacked the
authority to deport Jimdnez-became an important part of the subsequent litigation.
6 See Montejo'v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Montejo 11), 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 1267.
73 See Deborah Sontag, Jury Rules for Hospital that Deported Patient, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2009, at Al0 [hereinafter Sontag (July)].
74 Id. As of the date of writing, Gaspar's attorneys had filed a motion for a new trial, but
the motion had not yet been ruled upon by the judge. See Melissa E. Holsman, Jiminez Lawyers
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It is important to note that, although these two cases arose out of
the same set of facts, the finder of fact and the relief requested
differed substantially. In the first case, a judge made the
determination in Jim6nez's favor. In the second, a jury made the
decision against Jim6nez. As the press reported, the second trial
occurred amidst strong public anti-immigrant sentiments with a jury
from a small town in which undocumented immigration is a
widespread issue.75 Additionally, while the first action sought to
prevent the hospital from taking certain actions, the second sought
monetary damages. Because the issue was complicated and the
hospital's obligations under existing laws unclear, the jury likely was
unwilling to financially penalize the hospital. As noted above, the
future predictability of the outcome of civil litigation on the issue of
medical repatriations remains unclear in light of the limited number
and differing results of these cases.
3. CriminalLiability
In addition to potential civil liability for false imprisonment,
hospitals may also be criminally liable under state kidnapping statutes
for "repatriating" unwilling individuals. The common law origins of
kidnapping closely resemble these situations-kidnapping was
defined as forcibly abducting a person from his or her own country
and sending him or her into another country.7 6 The modem crime of
kidnapping focuses on the involuntary detention of the victim in
violation of his or her liberty. Under the Model Penal Code, for
example, a person is guilty of kidnapping if he or she:
[U]nlawfully removes [a person] from his [or her] place of
residence or business, or a substantial distance from the
vicinity where he [or she] is found, or if he [or she]
unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place
of isolation, with any of the following purposes: (a) to hold
for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or (b) to
facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or (c)
to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;

Seek New Trial; Claim They Were 'Robbed of a Fair Trial,' STUART NEWS, Aug. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.tcpalm.con/news/2009/aug/05/jimenez-lawyers-seek-new-trial-claimthey-were-a/.
7 See Sontag (July), supra note 73.
76 See United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1988); Doss v. State, 123 So.
231, 235 (Ala. 1929); Ex parte McDonald, 146 P. 942, 943 (Mont. 1915) (discussing the
common law origins of the offense of kidnapping).
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or (d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental
or political function."
To the Author's knowledge, no hospital has been charged with
kidnapping for performing a medical repatriation. At first glance, it
may seem untenable to suggest that a hospital could be criminally
liable for medically repatriating an undocumented immigrant.
However, if one imagines a scenario identical to that of Jimdnez in all
respects but his immigration status, the argument may begin to seem
less peculiar. If a U.S. citizen, unable to pay her medical bills due to
her indigence, were smuggled onto a plane in the early hours of the
morning and left in a foreign country because that country supposedly
could provide less expensive rehabilitative services, there would
surely be immense public outcry against the hospital and demands for
the prosecutor to press charges. The public is less likely to be
sympathetic when an undocumented immigrant is repatriated.
However, immigration status is not an element of the offense of
kidnapping. Indeed, even if immigration status is considered, it
actually helps fulfill the elements of the crime because a private
deportation would "interfere with the performance of [a]
governmental or political function"-namely, the government's
ability to initiate and administer removal proceedings.
B. FederalStatutory Law
In addition to state law, there is a considerable body of federal

statutory law that is relevant to the subject of medical repatriations.
However, federal statutory law on the subject of medical repatriations
is unclear at best and contradictory at worst. As one author points out,
[I]mmigration and Medicaid reforms over the past decade
have created a de facto regulatory framework in which
repatriation has become an attractive solution for hospitals
faced with increasing costs of uncompensated medical care
for uninsured non-citizens. What is currently lacking, though,
is a set of legal or regulatory protections that would ensure
that these transfers protect patients' interests.
The interaction of the two major federal statutes with the greatest
impact on medical repatriations-the Emergency Medical Treatment
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1962).
Joseph Wolpin, Medical Repatriation of Alien Patients, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHics 152,
152 (2009).
7

7

2009]

CAST BACK INTO "TEMPEST-TOST" WATERS

293

and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA) 79 and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) 80 -is examined below.
1. Medicaid and the Requirements of EMTALA
In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA")8 ' in response to nationwide reports
of "patient-dumping" of uninsured patients by health care facilities.
Under EMTALA, "participating" 82 hospitals and ambulance services
must provide care to anyone in need of emergency medical treatment
who "comes to" an emergency department regardless of the person's
ability to pay.83 The statute includes an enforcement section and
provides for monetary penalties to be assessed against hospitals and
individual physicians who do not comply with the requirements of the
statute.8 It also provides for the availability of civil monetary
damages.s The civil damage provision, however, is rarely enforced,
and almost never to the full extent possible.86
Hospitals are required to provide "such further medical
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition."8 Several of the definitions in the EMTALA
statute have provoked varying interpretations and debate.
"Emergency medical condition" is defined, in part, as:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms
of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in-(i) placing the health of the individual
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
- 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1646 (2006).
81,Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (2006)).
82 "Participating" hospitals refers to those hospitals that accept Medicaid/Medicare
funds-in other words, almost every hospital in the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(e)(2).
83 Id. § 1395dd(a).
84 See id. § 1395dd(d).
85 See id.
8 See Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active labor Act: The
Anomalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 13-18 (1998) (setting forward detailed
statistics about the rates of government enforcement and explaining that the government rarely
enforces EMTALA). Though a private right of action exists, "the population that has historically
been most vulnerable to patient dumping is the poor and uninsured, a group of people often
unlikely to have a lawyer to turn to when their rights are violated. Thus, if the government does
not enforce EMTALA, or enforces it poorly, given the strong economic incentives of hospitals
to 'dump' patients, EMTALA's guarantees will be illusory." Id. at 5.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b).
7
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(or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the
woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of
any bodily organ or part.
Health care facilities are required to provide services regardless of
ability to pay. They cannot turn someone away who "comes to" their
emergency rooms. Hospitals, however, have developed a variety of
creative ways to discourage immigrants from "coming to" their
facilities in the first place. In Texas, for example, one hospital's
security guards wear uniforms that look like those the border patrol
wears, while another hospital questions those it suspects of being
undocumented immigrants about their immigration status and asks for
their documentation upon entry. 89 Many patients are aware that
hospitals are not restricted under federal law from reporting patients
to federal immigration officials, and the possibility of facing
questions about legal status or the apparent presence of border patrol
officers at the hospital dissuades many from seeking care. These are
the overt methods of deterring immigrants from seeking medical help,
whether in emergencies or non-emergencies. Many hospitals also
employ less obvious strategies to discourage undocumented
immigrants from seeking care. Such practices include harassing
patients who cannot pay their bills, making public statements about
the rising costs of care for "illegals," failing to provide translation
services, and publicizing that they will not provide services for
immigrants without indicating that they are legally required to
provide emergency care. 90 Even less directly, many immigrants know
that financial reliance upon the federal government can result in
denial of their applications for permanent residency or citizenship,
88 Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). It can be difficult to determine whether or not a condition falls
within this definition of an "emergency medical condition." For example, in Szewcwyk v.
Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that acute myelogenous
leukemia was an "emergency medical condition" within the meaning of the statute, and so the
state had to reimburse the hospital for treatment. 881 A.2d 259, 261 (Conn. 2005). Similarly, in
Luna v. Division of Social Services, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that there had
been insufficient evidence at trial to determine that an undocumented immigrant's treatment for
cancer did not fall under the definition of an "emergency medical condition." 589 S.E.2d 917,
925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). However, in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina found (1) that, for Medicaid purposes, an "emergency medical condition" is
one that manifests itself by acute symptoms at the time treatment is sought and requires
immediate treatment in order to stabilize the condition, and (2) that an undocumented
immigrant's acute lymphocytic leukemia was not an "emergency medical condition" when the
individual underwent chemotherapy treatments, and thus the state was not required to reimburse
the hospital for the costs of his treatment. 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006).
89 Clark, supra note 41, at 230.
9 See id.

2009]

CAST BACK INTO "TEMPEST-TOST" WATERS

295

since applicants must show that they will not become a "public
charge." 91 Such knowledge also deters many from seeking necessary
medical treatment.
Even if a patient is admitted, the more difficult question becomes:
at what point is the patient "stabilized" and no longer in an
"emergency" condition such that he or she can be discharged? And
what must the hospital do in order to discharge a patient? For some
patients, this is not a difficult issue. Someone who visits an
emergency room because of an asthma attack, for example, may
receive treatment through an inhaler or steroid dose, regain her ability
to breathe effectively, and eventually be able to leave the hospital
without a problem. For other patients, however, the question of when
they may be released is much more difficult. "Despite EMTALA's
prohibitions on 'patient dumping,' hospitals face difficult choices
when deciding how and when to discharge uninsured patients who
need extensive follow-up care after being stabilized. Under current
law, hospitals have a discharge option for non-citizens unavailable for
U.S. citizen patients: repatriation."92
Even EMTALA's use of the term "stabilize" is somewhat murky:
The term "to stabilize" means, with respect to an emergency
medical condition described in paragraph (1)(A), to provide
such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary
to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no
material deterioration of the condition is likely to result
from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility . .

.9

In addition to the stabilization requirement, hospitals are required
to release patients to an "appropriate facility." 94 Under the interpretive
regulations promulgated for Medicaid, this is defined as a facility that
"can meet the patient's medical needs on a post-discharge basis."95
91 See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(a) (2008). One author has pointed out that this policy deviates
substantially from the idealistic statement inscribed on the Statue of Liberty at what is one of the
largest points of immigration-both historically and presently-in the United States: "Give me
your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of
your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the
golden door!" Ruqaiijah Yearby, From the Mayflower to Border Patrols:Who DeservesAccess
to Health Care in the United States?, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. i, ii (2008). She writes, "[clontrary
to this endearing statement of welcome, the United States has intentionally closed its borders to
those deemed 'undesirable,' including the aforementioned huddled masses and homeless,
particularly if they are public charges." Id.
9 Wolpin, supra note 78, at 154.
9
9

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
See id. § 1395dd(c)(2).

95 59 Fed. Reg. 64,141, 64,149 (Dec. 13, 1994).
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This requirement is called into question with most medical
repatriations. As explained above, while some hospitals make an
effort to ensure that the patient is transferred to a facility that can
provide the type, level, and adequate quality of services needed,
others do not. While some follow up to ensure that patients are doing
well, many never make contact after the patient is flown or driven
back to his or her country of origin. As in the case of Luis Jim6nez,
patients often receive minimal treatment that is inadequate for their
medical needs, leaving significant questions about the compliance of
hospitals with their federal discharge requirements.
2. Medicaid and Welfare Reform
Welfare Reform added further complications to the existing
confusion under EMTALA. Under the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (more commonly
known as "Welfare Reform"), undocumented immigrants are
ineligible for Medicaid and other social services unless the state
legislation specifically provides for them. 96 The only exception to this
restriction is for emergency services-hospitals must provide
emergency treatment to anyone who arrives with an emergency
medical condition.97 The relevant provisions of this emergency
services exception are as follows:
(v) Medical assistance to aliens not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
(1) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section,
except as provided in paragraph (2), no payment may be
made to a State under this section for medical assistance
furnished to an alien who is not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.
(2) Payment shall be made under this section for care and
services that are furnished to an alien described in paragraph
(1) only if(A) such care and services are necessary for the treatment of
an emergency medical condition of the alien,

9
9

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (2006).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
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(B) such alien otherwise meets the eligibility requirements for
medical assistance under the State plan approved under this
subchapter (other than the requirement of the receipt of aid or
assistance under subchapter IV of this chapter, supplemental
security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this
chapter, or a State supplementary payment), and
(C) such care and services are not related to an organ
transplant procedure.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "emergency
medical condition" means a medical condition (including
emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such
that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy,
(B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
The regulations promulgated to interpret this section include the
additional words "after sudden onset" in the definition of emergency
services.9 "The final regulations, therefore, made relatively clear
when emergency medical treatment would begin, but left open the
question of when those services would no longer be available, i.e.,
when the state would no longer be reimbursed for providing those
services to illegal immigrants.""' The government will not reimburse
hospitals for non-emergency care or post-stabilization care, leaving
them in a difficult legal and financial position. As one author has
noted:
Although Congress intended to relieve the financial strain on
hospitals and medical centers with the passage of PRWOA
[sic], in reality, the Act imposes significant economic
hardships on hospitals and emergency rooms. A separate,
9

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2006).

- 42 C.F.R. § 440.255 (2006); see also Sean Elliott, Staying Within the Lines: The
Question of Post-StabilizationTreatmentfor Illegal Immigrants Under Emergency Medicaid, 24
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 149, 155 (2007) ("The most notable difference [in the
regulations] was the addition of the words 'after sudden onset' in the definition of emergency
services.").
10Elliott, supra note 99, at 155.
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pre-existing piece of legislation, the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), requires that
any hospital that receives Medicaid funding provide
appropriate screening and subsequent stabilizing care to
anyone who enters its emergency room doors. Thus, the
current legal framework forbids medical practitioners from
providing most preventive care to immigrants who fall under
PRWOA [sic], yet obliges these same practitioners to treat
immigrants with emergency medical conditions under
EMTALA. As one doctor explained, treating emergency
medical conditions that could have been prevented through
primary care is both "bad medicine" and "bad economics."'O'
C. ConstitutionalLaw
In addition to federal statutory concerns, some may look for
constitutionally based concerns. The Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 10 2
At first glance, it may seem as though there are compelling due
process or equal protection arguments to be made in cases involving
medical repatriations. However, because private hospitals are not
states or state actors, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
are not directly implicated.10 3 That private hospitals accept federal
101
Ryan Knutson, Note, Deprivation of Care:Are FederalLaws Restricting the Provision
of Medical Care to Immigrants Working as Planned?, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 401, 404-05
(2008) (footnotes omitted).
1o2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
103 In cases involving state action, the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
may apply to immigrants, though the law is somewhat murky. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), the Supreme Court held that undocumented immigrants could claim the benefit of the
Equal Protection Clause, id at 215, and that the actions by a public school district in denying
access to schools to undocumented immigrant children did not meet the rational basis test,
therefore violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 230. In Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567
(2d. Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held that the Welfare Reform Act's denial of prenatal care to
undocumented immigrants had a rational basis and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
id. at 584, but found that denying automatic eligibility for Medicaid coverage at birth to citizen
children of non-citizen parents did violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 591. In Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Supreme Court held that provisions of a state welfare law
conditioning receipt of benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirements
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 382-83. In Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976),
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money through Medicare/Medicaid is unlikely to change this
analysis-accepting federal funding does not, on its own, make an
organization a "state actor" for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.M Despite the inequities that are clearly implicated in
medical repatriations, constitutional arguments are unlikely to provide
any viable form of relief.
D. InternationalLaw
As with potential challenges arising out of United States
constitutional law, actions based in international law are unlikely to
be successful. Obligations under international conventions, such as
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination'0 5 or the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 10 are not directly implicated because the
actions of private hospitals are not state actions. While it may be
possible to formulate legal arguments based upon a nation's
obligation to ensure the protection of the rights of those found within
its borders, 10 7 courts in the United States have been largely
unresponsive and unsympathetic to arguments based in international
law. 0 8

however, the Supreme Court held that an act by Congress conditioning an immigrant's
eligibility for federal medical insurance on continuous residence in the United States over a
five-year period did not deprive the immigrant of liberty or property without due process of law.
Id. at 87. As one author has summarized: "Ultimately, Richardson and Diaz led to the
understanding that state restrictions [of Medicaid benefits for immigrants], subject to strict
scrutiny, would in most cases be struck down, while federal restrictions, dictated by a narrow
standard of review, would likely be upheld." Knutson, supra note 101, at 413.
1
0 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (holding that the receipt of
public funds by private parties is insufficient to make the private party a "state actor" and
thereby to trigger constitutional obligations). But see id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that if there is a close nexus between the government and a private party's actions,
then courts may treat the private party as a state actor).
ia0International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedfor signatureMar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
'0 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, openedfor signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
107For example, the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race and/or
national origin, or the less widely recognized right to health (derived in part from the ICESCR).
"See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (stating that judgments of the
International Court of Justice do not constitute binding federal law); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (explaining that "[t]he overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty . . . [and] the opinion of the world community, while not
controlling [the Court's] outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for [the
Court's] conclusions").
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III. SAILING THE "UNCHARTED SEAS"
In light of the confusing legal and regulatory morass outlined
above and in combination with fierce public anti-immigrant
sentiment, it is possible to understand why medical repatriations
occur. However, it is also very clear that reform is needed, and it is
needed now. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to delve deeply
into precise recommendations for reform of laws like EMTALA and
PRWORA. Other scholars have dealt with these questions in great
detail."0 This Comment merely proposes that any attempts to revise
substantive immigration law, health care law, or even state tort law in
areas such as false imprisonment, must take the issue of medical
repatriations into serious consideration.
First, undocumented immigrant patients must be allowed to avail
themselves of the same sorts of judicial processes that would be
afforded to those undergoing formal deportation proceedings. A
private corporation should not be allowed to effect extra-judicial
deportations, particularly when the reason for doing so is purely due
to private monetary concerns and is not based on the same interests
that are behind federal deportation policies. The federal government
has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters, and hospitals
must be subject to much deeper federal guidance, involvement, and
accountability.
Second, the contradictory incentives and requirements of the
current system of regulations must be resolved in light of the situation
of undocumented immigrants. Policies about what type of care will be
provided and when should be based on principles of public health and
human dignity rather than on perverse value judgments about
"deserving" versus "undeserving" recipients of public funds.
' For in-depth critiques and recommendations of existing legislation, see Julia Field
Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-Immigrant Provisions of the
'Contract with America' Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1069-70 (2002) (advocating the repeal of
PRWORA and seeking adequate funding for healthcare services, effective outreach, approaches
accounting for cultural differences, and a more informed medical community); Dame, supra
note 86 (addressing problems related to the enforcement of EMTALA); Elliott, supra note 99
(arguing for "Medicaid reimbursement for treatment of post-stabilization emergencies" and for
courts "to acknowledge the deference towards health care providers contemplated in the
Emergency Medicaid statute"); Knutson, supra note 101 (addressing the effects of PRWORA,
and arguing for repeal of the anti-immigration portions of the Act and for allowing local medical
providers to decide which services to provide); Neda Mahmoudzadeh, Comment, Love Them,
Love Them Not: The Reflection ofAnti-Immigrant Attitudes in Undocumented Immigrant Health
Care Law, 9 SCHOLAR 465 (2007) (analyzing the drawbacks and ineffectiveness of healthcare
regulation in reducing the illegal entry of immigrants into the United States); Vivian L. Regehr,
Comment, Please Resuscitate! How FinancialSolutions May Breathe Life into EMTALA, 30 U.
LA VERNE L. REv. 180 (2008) (arguing for abolishment of EMTALA, coupled with provision of
financial incentives to hospitals to offer free preventive care through urgent care centers).
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Third, it is clear that whatever the specific reforms, the federal
government must increase the amount of support and reimbursement
funds it provides to hospitals. Private hospitals are crumbling under
the weight of uncompensated debt, and without an increase in
resources, many more indigent people-both citizens and
non-citizens-will face even greater obstacles to access for health
care.'t 0 This additional support to hospitals must go beyond providing
more funds for emergency care-it must also incorporate funding for
post-stabilization care and, ideally, preventative care to keep the
overall costs of health care down over the long term.
Finally, while enforcing or creating a law that prevents hospitals
from engaging in medical repatriations is important, stopping there
would be an incomplete solution. The issue of medical repatriations
stands as an archetypical intersection of "two deeply flawed
American systems""'1 : immigration policy and health care policy.
Cases like that of Luis Jim6nez cannot be boiled down to a simple
little-man-versus-the-big-institution narrative because behind the "big
institution" (i.e., the hospital) is an even bigger institution (i.e., the
federal government), which holds the "big institution" in a legal and
financial Catch-22. The issue of medical repatriations "shows patients
at the mercy of hospitals and hospitals at the mercy of a system that
provides neither compensation nor guidance."' 1 2
Until the health care system is reformed-and the situation of
undocumented immigrants is taken into serious consideration in that
process-efforts to protect vulnerable immigrants will come at the
expense of underfunded community hospitals, and efforts to protect
these community hospitals will come at the expense of vulnerable
immigrants.
SARAH E. GREENLEE'

no See, e.g., Clark, supra note 41, at 249.
111Sontag (August), supra note 1.
1
2Sontag (November), supra note 17.
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010. Many thanks to
Obiajulu Okuh for all of his help.

